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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MILK MARKETING SYSTEM AND AN 
ANALYTICAL VIEW OF UNIQUE QUALITIES EFFECTS ON MILK PRICES IN 
THE SOUTHEAST 
 
The Southeast Order has been milk deficit for over ten years and because of this milk has 
to be brought in from other orders to meet processor’s demand. Transportation credits 
provide processors with help to cover transportation costs to bring outside milk into the 
order. To help keep Class I utilization and support milk prices, relative to orders in the 
North, Order 7 has low diversion limits. As milk produced within Order 7 has been on a 
downward trend, milk brought into the order has not increased as consistently. In 2000 
milk pooled from farms within the order made up an average of 66% out of the total 
amount pooled compared to a 2012 average of 43%. The objectives of this paper are to 
review the history of the federal milk marketing system, describe the structure of milk 
pricing, examine the unique features of the southern orders, and estimate the impact of 
the amount of milk diverted and the amount paid in transportation credits on Order 7’s 
uniform price. The results showed that only Class II diverted pounds had a statistically 
significant impact on the uniform price. 
 
Keywords: Diversion limits, transportation credits, federal milk marketing orders, panel 
data, Southeast Order 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Diversions have recently become a point of contention for the Appalachian and Southeast 
Orders, also known as Order 5 and Order 7, respectively. Diversions are a limit placed on 
the amount of pooled milk that a pool plant may divert to a non-pool plant and still be 
pooled on an order. In 2014 there was a request for the diversion limits in the Southeast 
Order to be lowered to 0%, but that request was denied (USDA-AMS, Florida and 
Southeast Marketing Areas, Combined Comments, 2014). Since the Southeast Order has 
a “milk deficit” status, milk producers who pool their milk on the order perceive 
diversions as putting downward pressure on the milk price they receive. Both the 
Appalachian and Southeast Orders have diversion limits of 25% during the months of 
July through November and January through February. The months December and March 
through June have a limit of 35%. The diversion limits for the Appalachian and Southeast 
Orders can be viewed in their federal order language (USDA-AMS, Historical 
Documents) There is a need and purpose for diversions, but what is the appropriate 
percentage of diversions to be beneficial to both producers and processors? 
 
Transportation credits are another point of contention for dairy farmers who pool their 
milk on Order 7. Transportation credits date back to 1996 and are an assessment rate on 
each hundredweight of milk classified for fluid use that is received or handled by a 
regulated plant. The assessment rate then goes into a fund, and processors/handlers can 
apply for the credits to help cover transportation costs associated with bringing in 
supplemental milk from outside of the order’s regional boundaries. These credits are 
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currently only active in the Appalachian and Southeast Orders. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that farmers believe they are paying for the transportation credits out of their 
milk check since the processors/handlers have to pay into the transportation credit 
balancing fund. Since the Southeast Order is a milk deficit region, transportation credits 
were established to help processors and handlers with the transportation costs of bringing 
in milk from outside the order’s regional boundaries. The transportation credits have not 
been formally asked to be removed, but their effect on Order 7’s uniform price, like 
diversion limits, is unknown.  
 
This study focuses on how both the amount of milk diverted into lower classes (any class 
other than Class I) and the sum of money paid to processors/handlers for transportation 
credits affect the Southeast Order’s uniform (or blend) price. The uniform price and blend 
price are the same and will be used interchangeably throughout this study. The original 
intent was to focus on both the Appalachian and Southeast orders, but because of a 
difference in data availability between the orders, this was not possible. However, 
because of the similarities between the Southern orders the research findings should have 
implications for the Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders. 
 
Since the Southeast Order is a milk deficit region, it is hypothesized that lowering 
diversion limits, which will reduce the amount of milk diverted into lower classes, will 
help to increase the blend price by increasing Class I utilization. The second hypothesis is 
that transportation credits have a negative effect on uniform price because they encourage 
processors/handlers to bring in excess amounts of milk from outside the order, which can 
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then be diverted into lower classes of milk. This study will test that theory by looking at 
whether the pounds of milk diverted into Classes II, III, and IV cause the order’s uniform 
price to decrease and then looking at the impact of the dollars paid for transportation 
credits on Order 7’s uniform price.  
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 provides an overview of the federal 
milk marketing order. Chapter 2 discusses the history of federal milk marketing more 
extensively and details the way classes of milk are priced. Chapter 3 describes how the 
Southern milk marketing orders are unique. Chapter 4 provides analytical models that 
detail the effects of diversions and transportation credits on the uniform price, and 
Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions and implications of the discussion and research 
presented in this paper.  
 
1.1 Federal Milk Marketing Order History 
The history of the federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) is a long one that has gone 
through many transformations since the orders were first organized. The purpose of the 
orders is to provide market stability for both milk producers and processors due to milk’s 
perishability and seasonal fluctuations. Additionally, there was a desire to strengthen the 
bargaining position of producers against handlers (Christensen, 1978). The start of 
FMMOs began in 1933 with the Agricultural Adjustment Act that granted the federal 
government authority to regulate the handling of milk. The order language for the 
FMMOs was first developed in 1937 by the Agricultural Marketing Act (Figure 1). As 
time has gone by, the FMMOs have added a new class of milk (Class IV) with the 
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Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 and incorporated transportation credits in some 
orders. There have also been dramatic changes in the way the milk price is calculated. 
From the 1960s to 1995 the Minnesota-Wisconsin (M-W) price determined milk pricing, 
but in 1995 the Basic Formula Price (BFP) was used, and then in 2000 Multiple 
Component Pricing (MCP) became the new standard formula.   
 
 
       Figure 1. Federal Milk Marketing Order Timeline 
 
 
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 addressed some commodities, but a primary 
focus of the law discussed regulating milk and milk products. Interestingly, the word 
“diversion” is not written anywhere within the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 
1937. Since 1937, the number of orders has varied; there were 83 orders at one time in 
1962 (Christensen, 1978). As transportation costs have decreased and milk hauling has 
become more efficient, milk distribution has widened, which in effect has decreased the 
need for a large number of marketing orders. A 2014 study showed that the transportation 
credits were having the intended effect by encouraging the movement of milk from low 
Federal Milk Marketing Order Timeline 
1933 – Agricultural Adjustment Act 
 Gave federal authority to regulate the handling of milk 
1937 – Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to issue milk 
orders 
1996 – Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act ( 
Instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to consolidate 
the number of milk orders to between 10 and 14 
2000 – Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 
Consolidated the number of federal orders from 31 to 
11, replaced the basic formula price (BFP) with a new 
milk price formula, and created a new class of milk 
(Class IV) 
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to high utilization markets (Seo & McCarl, 2014). The orders have also shifted from 
being centered around cities to becoming regionally based.  
 
Figure 2. Change in Federal Milk Marketing Orders After Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2000 (Cropp, 2001) 
 
 
It seems most transformations to the orders have happened more recently. The 1996 Farm 
Bill (Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996) encouraged the 
Secretary of Agriculture to consolidate the 31 orders to between 10 and 14, and the 
Secretary came back with a recommendation of 11 milk marketing orders. Once the 
federal milk marketing orders were consolidated there were a total of 11 orders. 
However, the Western FMMO, which consisted of Utah and parts of Nevada, Idaho, and 
Oregon, was terminated in April 2004, reducing the number of orders to 10 which is 
where it has stayed for over 10 years1. The difference between the original 31 orders and 
the present 10 orders is striking in some areas and has no difference in others. The 
Southeast Order (Order 7) and Pacific Northwest Order (Order 124) are two whose 
marketing areas are very similar to their originals. The current Central Order (Order 32) 
                                                          
1. The Western FMMO, Order 135, was terminated because a set of proposed changes was voted on, 
and because the changes did not get 2/3 of the vote the order was dissolved. 
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had consisted of over six different orders before it was consolidated. Additionally, the 
Appalachian Order (Order 5) is a marketing area that was originally made up of two 
orders and some non-order area. Order 5 now covers all of North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and the majority of Kentucky, and the eastern side of Tennessee. The changes 
in the federal orders after the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 can be viewed 
above in Figure 2.  
 
1.2 The Classification of Milk 
As the orders have changed, so has the classification of milk. The Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2000 added a fourth class of milk when there were originally three.  
 
Table 1. The Classes of Milk Pre and Post Consolidated Appropriations Act 
 
As can be seen from Table 1 detailing the pre and current classes of milk, the main 
change resulting from the Consolidated Appropriations Act was that Class III was 
divided into two classes separating cheese from butter and dry milk. Along with different 
classes of milk, there are different grades of milk: Grades A and B. Grade A milk has 
stricter sanitary standards so that it can be used for fluid milk, and because Grade B milk 
has less stringent standards it is only able to be used in manufacturing products. By 1999, 
however, 97% of U.S. milk met Grade A standards (Sumner & Balagtas, 2002).  
Classes of Milk 
Pre Consolidated Appropriations Act  Post Consolidated Appropriations Act 
Class I – Fluid Use Class I – Fluid use 
Class II – Soft manufacturing products Class II – Soft manufacturing products 
Class III – Hard manufacturing products Class III – Cheese 
 Class IV – Butter and dry milk 
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Since most U.S. milk is Grade A, the grade is not as much of an issue. Classification of 
Milk is a crucial part of milk orders though since the class is a component of milk price 
discovery. Each order has different class utilizations depending on what type of milk 
processors are located within a region and how much milk they each individually process. 
The Midwest Order (Order 30), for example, is dominated by manufacturing plants, such 
as cheese and thus has the lowest Class I utilization of any order. Due to the high volume 
of manufacturing plants, the milk that is pooled in the Midwest Order has a very high-
Class III utilization often over 80% (USDA-AMS, Federal Milk Marketing Order 
Marketing and Utilization Summary). The Appalachian and Southeast Orders both have 
high Class I utilizations because the processors within that region are mostly fluid milk 
plants. The Appalachian, Southeast, and Florida Orders have the largest Class I 
utilization out of the 10 orders with utilization consistently above 60%. Most other milk 
orders, except the Midwest Order, range from 20-40% for their Class I utilization. Class I 
milk is priced the highest out of the four which allows the Southern orders to have a 
relatively higher blend price. Class II typically follows Class I with the second highest 
price. While the Class IV price is usually the lowest, occasionally, the Class III milk has 
a lower price.  
 
1.3 Class I Differentials 
Many parts of the federal milk marketing orders are integral to the current regulatory 
system. An important part to discuss is the Class I differentials, which are also known as 
location differentials. The goal of the Class I differentials is to “generate sufficient 
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revenue to assure an adequate supply of milk while maintaining equity among handlers in 
the minimum prices they pay for milk bought from dairy farmers (USDA-AMS, Class I 
Pricing Structure).” Simply put, Class I differentials attempt to ensure an adequate supply 
of milk wherever a plant is located.  
 
When the Secretary of Agriculture consolidated the 33 milk orders in 2000 to 11 orders, 
the marketing areas for each order understandably changed. This consolidation also 
altered the Class I differentials, which is why an adjusted Class I pricing structure was 
developed with the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000. There were two options to 
set the Class I differentials: option 1A, which focused on location, and option 1B, which 
focused on relative value. Option 1A is the option that Congress approved even though 
the Secretary of Agriculture recommended Option 1B. Option 1A is “location-specific 
Class I differentials reflecting the relative economic value of milk by location (USDA-
AMS, Class I Pricing Structure).” An important part of Class I differentials is that they 
differ by county. This means that a dairy producer who ships their milk to a processing 
plant in County A and their neighbor who sends their milk to a plant in County B could 
receive a different price for their milk if the Class I differential is higher in County A 
than B.  
 
1.4 Milk Deficit Orders 
Since Option 1A focused on location and economic value the Class I differentials are 
comparably higher in the Florida, Appalachian, and Southeast orders. This option also 
included a component that reflected “regional differences of fluid and manufacturing 
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milk (USDA-AMS, Class I Pricing Structure).” Within these southern orders along with a 
high Class I utilization and there is also a milk deficit. All three orders have been milk 
deficit since the FMMOs were consolidated from 33 orders to 11 (USDA,Marketing 
Service Bulletin, 2002). The term “milk deficit” refers to a region’s inability to meet milk 
demand and having to meet pool distributing plant demand by bringing in milk from out 
of the area. Transportation credits and a higher blend price in Orders 5 & 7 help to attract 
milk from outside of the area to meet processors milk demand. However, as consumer’s 
demand for fluid milk continues to decrease, Class I utilization will also drop, meaning 
that the blend price could fall low enough to potentially force out small dairy farms 
within Orders 5 & 7. The decline in fluid milk sales in the Southeast order’s uniform milk 
price is displayed in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. U.S. Fluid Milk Sales and Southeast Uniform Price (USDA-ERS, Dairy      
Data; USDA-AMS, Florida and Southeast Marketing Areas) 
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1.5 Milk Pricing 
The blend price can be calculated one of two ways depending on the order. If a producer 
sends their milk to an order that uses skim-fat pricing, then the blend price will be the 
same as the uniform price (not including premiums). However, a majority of orders 
within the federal milk marketing system use Multiple Component Pricing (MCP). The 
difference between skim-fat pricing and MCP can be seen below in Table 2.  There are 
currently four orders out of the ten that do not use MCP, and those are Order 5, 6, 7, and 
131 (Arizona Order). The MCP system bases the milk price on pounds of proteins, 
butterfat, and other solids. Essentially, the MCP rewards producers who make high-
quality milk by paying them a higher milk price. One could also assume that producers 
who do not produce high-quality milk are either forced to produce better quality milk or 
leave the dairy industry. The current pricing formulas can be found in the appendix. 
 
Table 2. Skim-Fat Pricing vs. Multiple Component Pricing 
Skim-Fat Pricing Multiple Component Pricing 
  
Handlers: Handlers: 
Pay for pounds of butterfat and skim for 
all classes 
Pay for pounds of butterfat (all classes), 
Class I pounds of skim, Class II pound of 
nonfat solids, Class III pounds of protein 
and other solids, Class IV pounds of 
nonfat solids 
 
Producers: 
Are paid for pounds of butterfat and 
skim of the weighted average of all four 
classes 
 
Producers: 
Are paid for pounds of butterfat, protein, 
other solids, any residual value 
 
11 
 
 
1.6 Appalachian and Southeast Milk Marketing Orders 
Both the Appalachian and Southeast orders have a Transportation Credit Balancing Fund. 
This transportation fund automatically accumulates $0.15 for the Appalachian order and 
$0.30 for the Southeast Order per hundredweight of designated fluid use milk that a 
handler receives or handles (USDA-AMS, A Primer on Federal Order Transportation 
Credits, 2010). The fund is then available for processors to use to aid with their 
transportations costs that were incurred transporting in supplemental milk in the case that 
the marketing area is not able to sufficiently meet the processor's milk demand.  
 
Due to the Appalachian and Southeast orders having been milk deficit for multiple years, 
the high Class I differentials and transportation credits were and are used as incentives to 
increase the milk supply. These two orders struggle to maintain a high blend price and 
meet market area milk demand simultaneously. Within both of these orders, there is a 
one-day delivery requirement per month. The delivery day requirement means that an out 
of area producer needs to only supply one day of milk production within either of those 
orders to qualify for the higher blend price for the rest of the month. An important note is 
that a producer who takes their milk to more than one order will automatically qualify for 
the order with the higher blend price. The one-day delivery requirement is good for the 
out of area producers who might be in an area that has more manufacturing plants such as 
cheese plants and would, therefore, receive a lower price for their milk if they stayed 
within their order the whole month. However, this has a potentially adverse effect on the 
blend price for all producers who have their milk processed within the Appalachian and 
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Southeast orders. For example, an out of order producer who only delivers one day a 
month to a regulated plant in Order 7 can have their milk be pooled on Order 7. That 
producer’s milk can then take his/her milk the rest of the month to a non-pool plant and 
still receive the pooled high blend price. Since this milk is from another area, meaning 
they’re from within another order, the chances of this producer having their milk be 
processed for a class other than Class I is higher than if all of the out of order producer’s 
milk came to Order 7. The out of area milk from this producer that is taken to non-pool 
plant will then be pooled on Order 7 and has a high chance of lowering the Class I 
utilization, which then consequently reduces the blend price as well. 
 
1.7 Delivery Day Requirements 
The delivery day requirements vary by order. The Florida Order, for example, has a ten-
day delivery day requirement. By requiring that producers have to deliver ten days worth 
of milk to a plant within the marketing area, the Florida order is ensuring that the out of 
order milk is processed in a plant that has a higher chance of being a fluid milk 
processing plant. The stringent delivery day requirement keeps their Class I utilization 
high, and therefore the blend price relatively high as well. Florida is an outlier among 
other orders when it comes to delivery day requirements. Most orders have a one-delivery 
requirement. The delivery day requirement may be temporarily increased or decreased by 
the market administrator if an investigation, which can be prompted by the administrator 
or an individual, finds that change is needed (USDA-AMS, Order Regulating the 
Handling of Milk in the Southeast Marketing Area, 2014).  
 
13 
 
The delivery day requirement can be a point of contention between producers and 
processors. However, the diversion limit is a regulation that can be even more of concern 
for producers. Like delivery day requirements, diversion limits vary from order to order 
and can be temporarily adjusted by the market administrator of each order. The market 
administrator can change the diversion limits temporarily, but a proposal to change the 
diversion limits permanently must pass “either two-thirds of the dairy farmers voting or 
producers representing two-thirds of the milk that would have been pooled during a 
designated month must approve” the change (USDA-AMS, Questions and Answers on a 
Potential Proposal for a California Federal Milk Marketing Order, 2015).” Diversion 
limits are often higher in the fall and winter months when supply is heavier, and demand 
is lower compared to lower diversion limits in the spring and summer months where 
supply is lower, and demand is higher. The lower diversion limits in the spring and 
summer are to ensure that there is a sufficient supply of milk within the order. Diversions 
can be a complicated matter but described simply it is the amount of milk that can be 
delivered directly from a farm to a non-pool plant but still pooled on the order and qualify 
for the blend price (Figure 4).   
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     Figure 4. Pool and Non-Pool Plant Definitions 
 
 
Diversion limits can have different effects on an order depending on the order’s current 
milk status. In 2005 there was a hearing held to determine if Order 33, the Mideast Order, 
should lower their diversion limits from 60% to 50% from August to February and 70% 
to 60% from March to July. There were some that were concerned that lowering these 
diversion rates would cause the cooperatives within the area to gain an even larger share 
of the market share (Cotterill, 2005). However, other witnesses supported amending the 
diversion limits to get a better understanding of the market’s Class I needs and to prevent 
What is a non-pool plant?*  
A non-pool plant is a plant that is: 
1. Fully regulated by another 
Federal order 
2. Producer-handler plant 
3. Partially regulated distributing 
plant 
4. Unregulated supply plant 
5. An exempt plant 
 
What is a pool plant?  
A pool plant is a fully regulated plant 
that is: 
1. A distributing plant 
2. A supply plant 
3. A plant within the marketing 
area operated by a coop 
4. Two or more plants operated 
by the same handler and 
within the same marketing 
area 
 
For full definitions refer to order 
language ((USDA-AMS, Order 
Regulating the Handling of Milk in 
the Southeast Marketing Area, 2014) 
 
*These definitions have been 
simplified. 
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out of area producers from lowering the order’s blend price. Order 33 is an order that is 
not a milk deficit area, unlike Orders 5, 6, and 7. The concern that out of area pooling 
will lower Class I utilization and therefore reduce the blend price is a mutual concern 
among the four orders: 5, 6, 7, and 33. As mentioned earlier, this is why the Florida Order 
has such high delivery day requirements. Due to Orders 5 and 7 having a different milk 
status than Order 33, the impacts of lowering the diversion limits could potentially be 
different. A milk deficit status means that all of the milk produced within the marketing 
area needs to stay in the area and plants should preferably only be bringing in milk that is 
needed. While Orders 5 and 7 have the lowest diversion limits out of all the orders, 
except Florida, they are still struggling within producing enough milk to supply 
processors demands. Milk that is coming from out of the area from places such as Texas 
or Illinois only has to deliver one day worth of milk to Orders 5 or 7, where the milk 
could be diverted into a lower class, to be pooled on Order 5 or 7.  
 
The issues of diversions is not a simple task to explain. However, because their impact on 
producers within an order is unknown, it is important to attempt to quantify what is 
potential effect on price. The next few chapters will go into more detail about the history 
of the federal milk marketing orders and what makes the southern orders unique. 
Additionally, Chapter 4 will take an analytical look at the impact of both diversions and 
transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price.  
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Chapter 2: The History and Class Pricing of Federal Milk Marketing Orders 
 
The regulation of milk is an important part of the development of the milk industry, and 
an understanding of the history of milk regulation is critical to understanding the pros and 
cons of the current industry. Additionally, to understand milk pricing, it is important to 
understand the history of the federal milk marketing orders. This chapter will provide 
information on how milk became regulated and how the class pricing system works. A 
glossary (Appendix 1) is provided at the end for reference.  
 
2.1 Background 
In 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Act gave the federal government the authority to 
regulate the handling of milk. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement of 1937 then gave 
the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to issue marketing orders, and one of those 
marketing orders was for milk. The Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) have 
evolved considerably since they were authorized in 1937.  
 
Initially, the marketing orders were designed to coordinate the supply and demand of 
milk. Since milk is a perishable commodity regional boundaries were established to help 
ensure that milk produced could meet demand from local economies. Both technology 
and transportation have improved over the last 80 years, and this has allowed regional 
boundaries to expand. The milk marketing orders have consolidated to as low as 10 
orders, as of 2016, and under these 10 milk marketing orders roughly “60 percent of all 
milk marketed in the United States is marketed… (Federal Milk Marketing Orders, 
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Section 10 Review, 2015).” Roughly, one-fifth of the remaining 40% of milk marketed 
comes from California (California Milk Advisory Board, 2016). The figure below shows 
the current regional boundaries of the 10 FMMOs (Figure 5), and the table below (Table 
3) details the names and number of each milk marketing order. 
 
 
Figure 5. Map of Federal Milk Marketing Orders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. List of Federal Milk Marketing Orders 
 
Federal Milk Marketing Orders 
Order 1 Northeast  
Order 5 Appalachian  
Order 6 Florida  
Order 7 Southeast 
Order 30 Upper Midwest 
Order 32 Central 
Order 33 Mideast 
Order 124 Pacific Northwest 
Order 126 Southwest 
Order 131 Arizona 
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The current orders were shaped by the 1996 Farm Bill, also known as the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996. This bill required the 
Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the 31 milk marketing orders to between 10 and 14. 
The Secretary initially consolidated the orders to 11 under the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2000. In 2004 the Western FMMO – Utah, and parts of Nevada, 
Idaho, and Oregon – was terminated, which is why there are currently only 10 Orders. 
The full federal milk marketing order timeline can be viewed below in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Federal Milk Marketing Order Timeline 
 
2.2 Class Pricing 
Originally, there were only three classes of milk, but after the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2000, the third class of milk was divided up into Class III and IV. 
These four classes of milk are: 
Class I – fluid milk 
 
1933 
Agricultural Adjustment Act 
Gave federal authority to 
regulate the handling of milk 
 
 
 
Authorized the Secretary of 
Agriculture to issue milk 
orders  
Agricultural Marketing Act 
1937 
 
1996 
FAIR Act 
Instructed the Secretary of 
Agriculture to consolidate 
the number of milk orders 
to between 10 and 14 
 
Consolidated the number of federal 
orders from 31 to 11, replaced the 
basic formula price (BFP) with a new 
milk price formula, and created a new 
class of milk (Class IV) 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2000 
2000 
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Class II – Soft manufacturing products (ice cream, cottage cheese, etc.) 
Class III – Hard cheese and cream cheese 
Class IV – Butter and dry milk.  
 
Each of the four classes of milk has a specific pricing formula that is calculated using a 
set of component prices (see Appendix 1). Class I and II have advanced pricing and are 
“based on the previous month’s end product pricing (McCullock, 2011).” Class I 
incorporates the higher of the advanced Class III, and IV skim milk prices. Advanced 
prices are based on the first two weeks of the preceding month. The Class II formula uses 
the advanced Class IV skim milk price. For example, Class III pricing uses the 
components of other solids, protein, and butterfat, while Class IV uses butterfat and 
nonfat solids as can be seen below (USDA-AMS, Current Price Formulas).  
 
The Class III and IV prices are determined using three steps (Jesse & Cropp, 2008). The 
first stage of formulating the Class III and IV price involves setting prices for milk 
components – butterfat, protein, nonfat milk solids, and other milk solids – by developing 
product price formulas. Jesse and Cropp (2008) describe the product price formula as: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
= �
𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
−
𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
� 𝑥𝑥 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 
 
Breaking that formula up, there are three important parts: product price, make allowance, 
and yield. The product price is the monthly average of the wholesale prices for each 
product – cheese, dry whey, butter, and nonfat dry milk (Jesse & Cropp, 2008). The 
20 
 
cheese component of the product price is specifically the wholesale prices of block and 
barrel cheddar cheese, and butter is Grade AA butter (Jesse & Crop, 2008). The second 
part of the product price, the make allowance, is the estimated manufacturing cost per 
pound and is determined through a survey of processors’ costs. The current make 
allowance for butter, for example, is $0.1715 (Class III butterfat price formula below) 
(Stephenson, 2007), which suggests that it costs roughly 17 cents to make one pound of 
butter. 
 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.1715) 𝑥𝑥 1.211. 
 
Lastly, the yield factor estimates how much of a product can be produced from one pound 
of a component. For example, from the Class III butter price formula the yield factor for 
butter is 1.211. This suggests that one pound of butterfat (the component) can yield 1.211 
pounds of butter (the product). After the component prices have been determined, stage 
one has been completed.  
 
In the second stage, the skim milk price is determined using the component prices that 
were previously discussed. Since a hundredweight of Class IV skim milk has been 
calculated to “contain 9 pounds of nonfat milk solids”, Class IV skim milk price is as 
follows:  
 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 = 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 9 
 
21 
 
The skim milk prices for Class III and IV are important because they are also part of 
Class I and II pricing formulas. Class II uses the advanced Class IV skim milk price to 
help determine Class II skim milk price, and Class I uses the higher of the advanced 
Class III or IV skim milk price to as part of the Class I skim milk price. 
 
The third and final stage in determining the Class III and IV prices is dependent on 
butterfat content. The Class III butterfat component price that was derived in the first 
stage is used with the Class III skim milk price that was discussed in the second stage to 
come up with the final Class III and IV prices. The Class IV price also uses the Class III 
butterfat price to determine its final price. Figure 3 below shows applicable pricing 
formulas for all four classes of milk.  
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Figure 7. Current Pricing Formulas (USDA-AMS, Current Price Formulas) 
 
Class utilization refers to the share of milk that is processed in each class. Regions with a 
relatively low level of milk production will see a larger proportion of their milk sold for 
fluid use and areas with relatively higher milk production will see more of their milk sold 
into the lower classes. For example, 70% Class 1 utilization would mean that 70% of the 
milk is processed as Class I, meaning it is processed for fluid consumption. Since the 
Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders are milk-deficit orders, more of the milk 
produced is processed as Class I for these regions. The Upper Midwest Order, Order 30, 
has minimal Class I utilization compared to the Southern orders, as can be seen in Table 
4 below.  
 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.965)  + (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 
=  𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 
+  𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙. 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 
=  𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝
+  (𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 100). 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.965) +  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 +  $0.70. 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 +  $0.007. 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶
9 . 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.965)  +  (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.1)  +  (𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 5.9). 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  ((𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.2003) 𝑥𝑥 1.383)  
+  ((((𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.2003) 𝑥𝑥 1.572) –  𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.9) 𝑥𝑥 1.17). 
𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 𝑎𝑎ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.1991) 𝑥𝑥 1.03. 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.1715) 𝑥𝑥 1.211. 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.965) +  (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 9. 
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 −  0.1678) 𝑥𝑥 0.99. 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. 
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2016 Class I Utilization 
Appalachian Southeast Florida Upper Midwest 
Jan 70.46 72.83 84.57 9.14 
Feb 69.8 73.25 83.37 9.16 
Mar 67.23 65.61 84.37 9.44 
Apr 66.02 64.29 84.48 8.88 
May 63.96 64.46 81.11 8.85 
June 64.84 64.79 83.56 8.64 
July 67.84 68.71 83.32 9.53 
Aug 74.23 80.98 84.14 13.2 
Sept 74.07 78.91 87.88 12.54 
Oct 70.57 74.29 83.09 10.24 
Nov 75.09 78.81 83.14 15.74 
Dec 71.53 71.64 83.24 14.5 
Table 4. 2016 Class I Utilization Percentages (USDA-AMS, 2016 Class           
I Utilization Percentage of Producer Milk, 2016) 
 
 
The Upper Midwest Order, for example, has a high Class III utilization, given a large 
number of cheese processing plants located within the order. Florida has the largest Class 
I utilization because a majority of their pool plants process Class I milk and the order has 
very low diversion limits compared to the rest of the orders. Florida’s diversion limits, set 
between 10% and 20% depending on the month, limit excess milk being pooled on the 
order. This prevention of excess amount of milk means a lower amount of milk will be 
potentially diverted into a lower class of milk which would lower the Class I utilization.  
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Figure 8. Diversion Limits (USDA-AMS, Diversion Limit) 
 
Diversions are excess milk that is not needed at a pool plant, so it is diverted to a non-
pool plant. Each order is allowed a certain percentage of the total amount of pooled milk 
to divert, which can be seen from Figure 8. Two relevant points of time circled in Figure 
4 represent changes in diversion limits. The circle on the left highlights when the 
diversion limits were lowered for the Florida Order from diversion limits of 20%, 25%, 
and 40% to 10%, 15%, and 20%. The second circle on the right side of Figure 4 depicts 
the 2008 lowering of the Appalachian and Southeast Orders diversion limits. This change 
also created consistent limits between the two orders. For the southern orders – the 
Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast – the lower the diversion limits, the less likely milk 
will be utilized for a class other than Class I.  
 
Class I differentials were intended to encourage the movement of milk from high supply 
areas to low supply areas. The differentials were meant to approximate estimated 
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transportation costs from these high supply areas to the low supply areas (Jesse & Cropp, 
2008). Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, there was an alteration of 
Class I differentials. Currently, the federal milk marketing order system has location-
specific Class I differentials. These differentials focus on location and economic value. 
Orders that are milk deficit – like the Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders – have 
higher Class I differentials than most other regulated areas. These differentials can differ 
by county. Two producers that are under the same milk marketing order and live in the 
same county can receive different prices for their milk if they happen to deliver to plants 
that are located in different counties because of the Class I differential. 
 
Due to Class I differentials being included in the Class I price, milk that is sold for fluid 
use will net the highest price per hundredweight. Typically, Class II prices will be the 
second highest price and Class III, and IV prices can vary behind Class I and II. The 
blend price is a weighted average price for all milk that is sold. So, the more milk that is 
sold into higher classes, the higher the blend price will be. For this reason, blend prices 
are higher in regions where Class I utilization is higher. Diversions are important because 
they have the potential to impact class utilizations. Every pound of excess milk that is 
pooled on the order has the potential to be used for Class II, III, or IV, which could lower 
the blend price. This is especially true in the south where Class I utilization is typically 
higher.  
 
Beyond the uniform price, the term mailbox price is often used in milk marketing. 
Similar to blend prices, mailbox prices can differ based on which order a producer pools 
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their milk on. The term pooled means an order’s total amount of milk that was received at 
a regulated pool plant. Pooled milk is eligible to receive federal order milk pricing. There 
are types of plants other than pool plants, but only pool plants are regulated by an order. 
Pooling can impact class utilization which then can impact the blend price that milk 
producers will receive in an order.  
 
The blend price is the price based on how much milk was used in each class of milk that 
was pooled in an order. However, while the blend price should be the same for all 
producers, the amount that producers actually receive will be impacted by the Class I 
differential and other costs. These other costs are incorporated into the mailbox price. 
The term mailbox price can be “defined as the net price received by dairy farmers for 
milk, including all payments received for milk sold and deducting costs associated with 
marketing the milk. All payments for milk sold include: over-order premiums; quality, 
component, breed, and volume premiums; payouts from state-run over-order pricing 
pools; payments from superpool organizations or marketing agencies in common; 
payouts from programs offering seasonal production bonuses; and, monthly distributions 
of cooperative earnings (USDA-AMS, Mideast Marketing Area, Mailbox Prices). 
Essentially, the mailbox price includes a wide number of additional payments that are not 
calculated within the blend price, but it is more representative of what is truly received by 
producers for milk. 
 
Additionally, mailbox prices are determined by different regions, and these regions do 
not align with federal milk marketing order regional boundaries. Figure 9 is a 
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representation of the current federal milk marketing orders and Figure 10 depicts areas on 
which mailbox prices are reported. While the regions are remarkably similar, there are 
some areas where the differences are significant. Some mailbox price regions are a state 
such as Minnesota and Wisconsin (which are both a part of the Upper Midwest Order) 
and New York (which is within the Northeast Order’s boundaries). The Southeast 
mailbox price, for example, includes the states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi. However, the Southeast marketing order’s region includes parts of 
Tennessee, Kentucky, and southern Missouri.  
.  
 
 
          Figure 9. Map of Federal Milk Marketing Orders 
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Figure 10. July 2016 Mailbox Prices (Hoard's Dairyman, Mailbox Prices; USDA-
AMS, Mailbox Milk Prices) 
 
The pricing of milk can be complicated with the different kinds of prices, the range of 
prices across FMMOs, and the various regulations that affect the amount of milk 
regulated under an order. However, these differences are put in place to benefit both 
producers and processors within an order’s regional boundaries. This publication 
explained how the federal milk marketing orders developed into their current state and 
summarized how milk prices are determined via those milk marketing orders. The goal 
was to make the complicated nature of the regulation of milk a little less complicated.  
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Chapter 3: The Unique Qualities of the Southern Milk Marketing Orders 
 
Milk is a heavily regulated commodity, and therefore there are a large number of rules 
that pertain to its production and processing. These regulations are enforced within 
regional boundaries called federal milk marketing orders. Most milk marketing orders 
have similar rules, but the Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders are somewhat 
unique when it comes to diversion limits, transportation credits, and delivery day 
requirements. This chapter will highlight these distinctive qualities of Southern milk 
marketing orders and how those qualities can influence production and processing in 
those orders. A glossary is at the end for reference (Appendix 2).  
 
3.1 Diversion Limits 
Every Federal Milk Marketing Order (FMMO), out of the current 10, has diversion 
limits. These diversion limits are explained within each federal milk marketing order’s 
language (USDA-AMS Historical Documents). Each order is a little different, so these 
documents outline the definitions and details used to regulate the order. This language 
and any changes in the order language are voted on by producers through a referendum. 
In order to pass a referendum “either two-thirds of the dairy farmers voting or producers 
representing two-thirds of the milk that would have been pooled during a designated 
month must approve” the change (USDA-AMS, Questions and Answers on a Potential 
Proposal for a California Federal Milk Marketing Order, 2015). Due to many milk 
producers being members of dairy cooperatives, these votes are often cast within a bloc 
vote. A bloc vote allows the co-op to vote for all of its members at once.  
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Diversion limits are the maximum amount of pooled milk that a pool plant can divert to a 
non-pool plant. These diversion limits vary by order and range from as high as 90% to as 
low as 10%. In Figure 11, the definitions of the pool and non-pool plants are detailed. 
Out of the total amount of milk that is gathered (or pooled) by plants regulated under a 
specific order (pool plants) only a certain percentage of that milk can be diverted to a 
plant that is not regulated by that order (non-pool plant). A pool plant is regulated under a 
federal milk marketing order, while a non-pool plant can be regulated under an order, but 
can receive diverted milk from other orders that classify the plant as non-pool. As an 
example, a plant that is regulated in the Appalachian Order but also receives diversions 
from the Southeast Order would be considered an Appalachian Order pool plant, but a 
Southeast Order non-pool plant.  
 
            
           Figure 11. Plant Definitions 
 
What is a pool plant?  
A pool plant is a fully regulated plant that is: 
5. A distributing plant 
6. A supply plant 
7. A plant within the marketing area 
operated by a coop 
8. Two or more plants operated by the 
same handler and within the same 
marketing area 
 
What is a non-pool plant?  
A non-pool plant is a plant that is: 
6. Fully regulated by another Federal 
order 
7. Producer-handler plant 
8. Partially regulated distributing plant 
9. Unregulated supply plant 
10. An exempt plant 
(Federal Order language) 
 
*Please refer to glossary for full definition. 
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The percentage of milk that can be diverted seems to coordinate closely with how much 
milk is produced or available within a milk marketing order’s boundaries. The Upper 
Midwest Order, for example, has the highest diversion limits with 90% of their pooled 
milk being able to be diverted. This order also has a large number of big dairy farms and 
produces a larger amount of milk. Due to their high production levels, they often have 
excess milk that needs to be processed, and plants have practical limits on the amount 
that they can handle. The large diversion limit allows the excess milk that plants within 
the order cannot process to be taken to another plant that is not regulated by the order. 
When this milk is diverted, producers are still able to receive the same price as if their 
milk had been processed at a plant regulated by their order as long as the percentage of 
milk diverted stays within the diversion limits.  
 
However, not all orders have excess milk within their regional boundaries. The Southern 
orders – Appalachian, Southeast, and Florida orders – do not have excess milk, and their 
orders would be labeled as milk deficit. Their milk deficit status means that they have 
much lower diversion limits than the Upper Midwest Order. The Appalachian and 
Southeast orders have diversion limits of 25% and 35% depending on the month, and the 
Florida order has even lower diversion limits at 10%, 15%, and 20% depending on the 
month. 
 
Lower diversion limits support Class I utilization by preventing excess milk from being 
processed as a lower class. The southern milk marketing orders have a high number of 
32 
 
fluid milk (Class I) processing plants. With the low diversion limits preventing a high 
percentage of surplus milk from being processed as Class II, III, or IV the blend price is 
also supported, compared to other orders. Ideally, the higher the Class I utilization 
percentage, the higher the uniform (or blend)2 price for that order, which further means 
that the milk producers within the Appalachian, Florida, or Southeast orders should 
receive a higher price for their milk per hundredweight. However, there are two different 
types of pricing within the milk marketing orders. There is multiple component pricing 
and skim-fat pricing. Skim-fat pricing is based on skim milk and butterfat pounds, while 
multiple component pricing is based on skim milk, butterfat, protein, nonfat solids, and 
other solids pounds. A 2014 study analyzed how multiple component pricing would 
affect the Southern milk marketing orders (Newton, 2014). For the Appalachian and 
Southeast Orders there would be an increase in money received, but a decrease for the 
Florida Order.  
 
Figure 12 and 13 below shows the mailbox prices for July 2016 and September 2016, 
respectively, which display that even though the Southern milk marketing orders have the 
highest Class I utilization out of the 10 orders, they do not consistently receive the 
highest mailbox price. Since mailbox prices include over-order premiums, an assumption 
could be made that regions such as New England or Wisconsin have farms that are 
producing large quantities of milk during the summer when supply often goes down that 
are earning them a milk price higher than their order’s uniform price.  
 
                                                          
2 The uniform price and blend price are the same and will be used interchangeably within 
this chapter. 
33 
 
 
Figure 12. July 2016 Mailbox Prices (Hoard's Dairyman, Mailbox Prices; USDA-AMS, 
Mailbox Milk Prices) 
 
 
Figure 13. September 2016 Mailbox Prices (Hoard's Dairyman, Mailbox Prices; USDA-
AMS, Mailbox Milk Prices) 
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Diversion limits have the potential to benefit both producers and processors, but their 
impact on producers in milk-deficit areas has been subject to much debate. For producers 
in milk-surplus areas, diversions are helpful because they allow those producers within 
the regional boundaries to receive a potentially higher price than if they had to transport 
their milk to another order.  
 
The diversion limits also benefit the milk processors by allowing them to have a 
“cushion” in their milk supply. Processors need to acquire a certain amount of milk to 
meet their demand. For processors to successfully meet that demand, they have to obtain 
more milk than what they plan to process. One reason for this is because milk that is 
brought in to be processed has to be tested for antibiotics. If a truck comes in that tests 
positive for antibiotics that milk will have to be turned away and discarded or used for a 
different purpose. The diversion limits allow processors and cooperatives to plan and 
prepare for the amount of milk that could arrive and test positive for antibiotics. 
However, an FDA study showed that less than 1% of milk tests positive for antibiotics 
though (FDA, 2015). Another reason for diversion limits is that they also help provide a 
supply cushion in case a producer is not able to produce as much milk as they have in the 
past or are contracted to produce. However, in orders like the south where milk supply is 
not as high, higher diversion limits negatively impact the price that producers receive for 
the milk they produce as a portion of this milk is diverted to lower classes. The 
attractiveness or unattractiveness of diversion limits depends on an orders milk supply 
market and the type of plants located within the order (Cotterill, 2005).  
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3.2 Transportation Credits 
Along with diversion limits, transportation credits are another distinctive trait of the 
Appalachian and Southeast Orders. The Appalachian, Florida, and Southeast Orders are 
unique in their milk deficit status. Each order’s inability to produce enough milk for the 
processor’s demand within each of their regions causes cooperatives and processors to 
have to look elsewhere for milk in order to obtain enough each month for their demands. 
The need to procure milk from outside the order creates an added transportation expense 
for milk processors. Due to the milk deficit status of both the Appalachian and Southeast 
Orders, transportation credits have been implemented within each order. The 
Appalachian and Southeast Orders are the only orders out of the 10 that have 
transportation credits, at the time this publication was written (USDA-AMS, A Primer on 
Federal Order Transportation Credits, 2010).   
 
So where does the money come from to pay for the transportation credits? Dairy 
processors and milk handlers pay a set amount each month based on how much Class I 
milk they receive or handle. This monthly payment goes into what is called a 
“transportation credit balancing fund” or what is also referred to as TCBF. Milk 
processors can then request payment from the TCBF during the months of January, 
February, and then July through December. These transportation credits provide another 
incentive for processors to bring outside milk into the southern regions. However, there 
are two stipulations to request money from the TCBF. A transportation credit primer that 
was developed to help explain transportation credits details these stipulations: 
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“In addition, bulk milk eligible to receive payment from the TCBF must… 
1. Come from dairy farmers whose milk was not pooled on that order for more than 
45 days during the immediately preceding months of March through May, 
2. Or from farmers with not more than 50 percent of their total production pooled on 
that order in those three months. (USDA-AMS, A Primer on Federal Order 
Transportation Credits, 2010).” 
 
The current monthly assessment rates for the Appalachian and Southeast Orders are 
$0.15 and $0.30, respectively. The transportation credit monthly rates have varied in the 
past since when the fund was established in 1996.  
 
3.3 Delivery Day Requirements 
The third unique quality of the Southern orders are delivery day requirements. Delivery 
day requirements are a number of days out of a month that a producer has to deliver their 
milk to an order to be able to have their milk pooled in that order. Most orders have a 
delivery day requirement of one day, including the Appalachian and Southeast Orders. 
However, Florida is an exception because they have a ten-day delivery requirement. This 
means that a producer has to have their milk delivered to Florida ten days out of the 
month to have their milk pooled on the Florida Order.  
 
Since Florida has high Class I utilization, the delivery day requirements are good for milk 
producers within the order by discouraging excess milk. On the other hand, the ten-day 
delivery requirement could be good for plants within Florida’s regional boundaries since 
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it potentially could ensure they have enough supply. Florida has a very high uniform 
price thanks to their high Class I utilization, and this can attract milk from outside of the 
order, but producers or cooperatives who want to receive Florida’s high uniform price 
have to make a commitment to the pool plants for a longer period.  
 
3.4 The Florida Order  
Florida is a very different order than the other nine milk marketing orders. The main 
differences are a high (if not, the highest average) Class I utilization percentage, 
extremely low diversion limits, and ten-day delivery day requirements. Florida is also 
different because of its geographical borders, except a small area in the Western 
Panhandle, is simply the state of Florida. All the other milk marketing orders are 
comprised of multiple states. Florida has the highest Class I differentials in the country, 
in addition to its high Class I utilization levels. The result is that producers receive higher 
milk prices in Florida than the other orders. Due to their uniqueness, Florida is an 
excellent example to consider when exploring whether lower diversion limits are an 
efficient way to handle the Appalachian and Southeast Orders increasing milk deficit 
status.  
 
While milk production in the Southeast Order has been decreasing, the Florida Order’s 
production has been able to stay relatively constant ranging between 2,127 and 2,536 
million pounds over the past 21 years from 1990 and 2011. At the same time, the 
Southeast’s milk production has decreased from 14,440 million pounds in 1980 to 9,096 
in 2011 (Covington, 2012).  
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Figure 14. Pooled Milk and Plants in Florida and Southeast Orders (USDA-AMS, Florida 
and Southeast Marketing Areas, Statistical Reports) 
 
Florida has a few pool plants compared to the other orders. Between 2000 & 2015 the 
Florida Order, Order 6, has decreased from 12 pool plants to 10 pool plants. The Upper 
Midwest Order, Order 30, had as many as 66 pool plants in 2014 and the Southeast 
Order, Order 7, had 22 pool plants in 2015. The small number of pool plants coincides 
with the lower amount of milk that is pooled on Order 6. It is also interesting that the 
number of cooperatives operating as pool handlers in Florida increased from 2 in 2000 to 
7 in 2013 and then 6 in 2015. This shows that it is possible for cooperatives to process 
and obtain enough milk for pool plants to meet their demand despite low diversion limits. 
The amount of pooled milk and number of plants in the Florida and Southeast Order can 
be viewed in Figure 14.  
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In 2000, the Florida diversion limits alternated between 20%, 25%, and 40%. Starting in 
November 2001 the diversion limits were lowered to 10%, 15%, and 20%. The diversion 
limits vary seasonally based on supply and demand. The months of July through 
November have a diversion limit of 10%, December through February are 15%, and 
March through June are 20%. The lowest diversion limit of 10% signals that demand 
could either be lower or supply could be higher during those months. A higher diversion 
limit of 20% could be because supply is low or demand is high meaning that processors 
need to secure a larger amount of milk. 
 
Florida lowered their diversion limits after a request from a cooperative that marketed a 
majority of the Florida Order’s milk. The request came before the market administrator, 
and an investigation was conducted. The market administrator’s investigation concluded 
that financial damage could occur to milk producers who regularly supply plants that are 
regulated on the Florida Order (USDA-AMS, Notice of Decision to Revise Diversion 
Percentage Limits, 2001). This financial damage could occur because of an excess 
amount of milk being pooled that is “not needed to meet the fluid demands of the market 
(USDA-AMS, Notice of Decision to Revise Diversion Percentage Limits, 2001).” The 
market administrator did not discuss what the details of the financial damage could be. 
However, the memo that announced the decreased diversion limits as a result of the 
request mentioned that the cooperative that made the request supplied 97 percent of the 
milk on the Florida Order.  
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3.5 Florida Compared to the Appalachian and Southeast Orders 
The Florida Order has some similarities to the Appalachian and Southeast Orders. All 
three orders suffer from milk deficits and have lower diversion limits than the rest of the 
milk marketing orders. While there have been requests to lower the diversion limits on 
the Southeast Order, the most recent request was to lower the limit to 0%, which is not a 
feasible percentage, and was denied (USDA-AMS, Florida and Southeast Marketing 
Areas, Combined Comments, 2014). Part of the discussion with changing/lowering the 
diversion limits for Orders 5 and 7 is whether lowering the diversion limits is a feasible 
task that would not hinder supply and demand within the regional boundaries. While the 
Florida Order is not the same in all aspects as the Appalachian and Southeast Orders, 
Order 6 does show that it is possible to have lower diversion limits and still meet 
processors demand, while at the same time providing a “cushion” to make sure plants can 
obtain enough milk to process. 
 
Comparing the Florida Order with the Appalachian and Southeast Orders we see lower 
diversion limits, higher delivery day requirements, and a much smaller regional 
boundary. The Florida Order has been able to maintain relatively stable milk production 
over the past 15 years. There has also been a decrease in pool plants, though there has 
been an increase in cooperative-handler plants. While Florida’s low diversion limits and 
extremely high delivery day requirements have not been statistically proven to be the 
reason for Florida being a successful order – it is still milk deficit – the state has been 
able to maintain production over the years. The high delivery day requirements can be 
assumed to help the plants with the low diversion limits by ensuring a commitment is 
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made on the producer’s side to guarantee at least ten days of milk to the order. These 
tools could have implications for the Appalachian and Southeast Orders to potentially 
modify their marketing orders in the future.  
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Chapter 4: What Evidence Is There That Diversions And Transportation Credits Impact 
The Uniform Price for Order 7? 
 
A dairy producer within the Southeast Order submitted a request to the Order 7 market 
administrator in 2014 for the diversion limits in the Southeast Order to be lowered to 0%. 
The dairy farmer wrote on behalf of himself and other dairy farmers within the order that 
they believed certain provisions were creating “inefficient handling of milk and result in 
disorderly marketing” (USDA-AMS, Robey Diversions Request, 2014). The request 
asked for diversion limits to be lowered to 0% for the months July, August, September, 
October, and November of 2014. The letter also mentioned that the dairy farmers of the 
Southeast Order “believe this is an emergency” (USDA-AMS, Robey Diversions 
Request, 2014). After an open period to receive comments on the request and holding 
several listening sessions, the market administrator, Patrick Clark, denied the request 
citing that the decision would be disruptive and could have unintended consequences 
(USDA-AMS, Diversion Limit Decision, 2014).  
 
The Southeast Order currently allows diversions up to 25% during the months of January, 
February, and July through November and 35% for months December and March through 
June. The diversion limits are lower than a majority of the ten other FMMOs. The 
Appalachian Order has the same diversion limits as the Southeast Order, and the Florida 
Order has the lowest diversion limits of all. These low diversion limits help the order 
cope with being “milk deficit” markets. Along with diversion limits, the Appalachian and 
Southeast Orders have transportation credits to help subsidize transportation costs for 
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processors and handlers. Milk pooled on Order 7 that is from farms within the Southeast 
Order has been on a downward trend since 2000 but has remained relatively stable since 
2012 as can be seen in Figure 15.  
 
 
        Figure 15. Milk Pooled On Order 7 (USDA-AMS, Florida and Southeast Marketing 
Areas, Market Administrator) 
 
The amount of literature that focuses on analyzing federal milk marketing order diversion 
limits is scarce, if not nonexistent. This could have many explanations, but part of the 
reasoning is due to the amount of data that is publically available via each federal order. 
While there is standard information provided by the market administrators, there is also a 
wide amount of information that varies per order making it not only difficult to compare, 
but also difficult to assemble. Order 7, for instance, publishes detailed information on 
diversions and transfers for each class going back to 2000. Order 5, however, has only 
published that information since 2014. The study provides an initial analysis of the 
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procured data and a framework for investigating the implications of diversions and 
transportation credits.  
 
Dairy farmers within the Southeast Order believe that the issue of diversions needs to be 
addressed and this is an emergency in their point of view. This study will help dairy 
farmers within the Southeast Order, and potentially other Southern orders, gauge the 
impact that both diversions and transportation credits are having on their milk price. The 
objective of this research is to quantify the effect of diverted pounds and a number of 
dollars paid out for transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price. 
 
4.1 Methodology 
 
Panel data is used for a number of reasons. The ability to utilize the time series 
component of data along with studying cross-sectional variables allows research studies 
to maximize their analysis. In the case of this research study there is no research to use as 
a background, and because of this, there is a chance that variables could be omitted. 
Using panel data helps solve the potential omitted variable problem. Woolridge (2002) 
states that using panel data will help “to obtain consistent estimators in the presence of 
omitted variables.” Using panel data analysis enables the potential omitted variables to be 
held constant, as its own variable, to obtain the partial effects of the observed explanatory 
variables. Woolridge follows Chamberlain’s (1984) example of using c to demonstrate 
the unobserved variable, where written in error form we see: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝑝𝑝 +  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 
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Where y is the dependent variable, 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 is the explanatory variables, 𝑝𝑝 
is the unobserved explanatory variables, and 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the error term. By assuming that c is 
time constant, using multiple years of data and differencing the equations allows the 
time-constant c to be eliminated. The differencing of equations can also be referred to as 
within-group estimation or fixed effects estimator.  
 
Arellano (2003) discusses two primary assumptions for a static fixed effect model, 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝛽𝛽 +  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 +  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
Arellano uses 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 as the unobserved variable and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as the error term in this example. 
This first assumption is that the error term is not correlated to the observed and 
unobserved explanatory variables,  
 
Ε(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) = 0 (𝐶𝐶 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇) 
 
Another way of looking at this assumption is that the error term “at any period is 
uncorrelated with the past, present, and future values of x (Arellano, 2003).” 
 
The second assumption is that “the errors are conditionally homoskedastic and not 
serially correlated,  
𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) =  𝜎𝜎2𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 
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Assumption 1, however, can be weakened to: 
 
Ε(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = 0 (𝐶𝐶 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇) 
 
And this assumption will be more often used for convenience, according to Arellano 
(2003), “since many results of interest can be obtained with it.” 
 
While work in the dairy sector on the impact of diversions and transportation credits is 
scarce, there is a significant amount of research that uses panel data. Most panel data 
research that focuses on dairy involves consumer demand or technical efficiency. In 
1996, Ahmad and Bravo-Ureta used panel data to examine “the impact of fixed effects 
production functions vis-a-vis stochastic production frontiers on technical efficiency 
measures.” The study looked at Vermont dairy farmers over a 14-year period and found 
the fixed effects technique to be superior, but overall their efficiency analysis was 
consistent with both models (Ahmad & Bravo-Ureta, 1996). Using Nielsen Homescan 
data, Copeland and Dharmasena (2016) were able to analyze the impact of rising demand 
for dairy alternative beverages on dairy farmers. Using a tobit econometric procedure it 
was found that white milk was a substitute for soymilk and almond milk, and people who 
buy white milk treat almond milk as a complement (Copeland & Dharmasena, 2016). Seo 
and McCarl (2014) look at how transportation costs, supply, and demand, along with 
seasonality can affect Class I milk price differentials using a random effects approach. 
The research found that changes in transportation costs or supply/demand are significant 
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and can cause an increase in Class I differentials. Seo and McCarl’s (2014) research also 
found that transportation credits were having their intended effect of moving milk from 
low utilization areas to high utilization areas. Foltz (2004) uses panel data to develop a 
model analyzing the factors that lead to dairy farms exiting the industry under the New 
England Dairy Compact. This analysis specified a random effects probit model and an 
autocorrelated generalized least squares model and found that the price supports enacted 
by the Dairy Compact helped to reduce the number of dairy farms exiting the industry for 
the area.  
 
Fixed Effects Models 
Time has been found to be an important component of dairy research. Due to time being 
such an important factor this model uses panel data to analyze both the time series 
element and the cross-sectional standpoint.  
 
The Southeast Order’s uniform price was specified in two linear regression equations. 
The first model focuses on the effect of diversions: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶4𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
The 𝑝𝑝 in this equation indexes the twelve months in a year for the years 2007 through 
2015 and is the time series factor of this model. The cross-sectional units for this model 
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are: Class II, Class III, and Class IV are the pounds of milk diverted for Class II, III, and 
IV each month, respectively, Class3 is the announced Class III price for each month, 
KYCorn is the price paid for Kentucky corn, and Milk Sales is the estimated amount of 
fluid milk sold in the United States each month.  
 
The second model focuses on the impact of transportation credits. Seo and McCarl (2014) 
determined that an increase in transportation costs can cause an increase in Class I 
differentials, and transportation credits helped to milk move from low to high utilization 
markets. This can be viewed as the effect of transportation on consumers by moving milk 
to milk deficit areas, and the following regression focuses on the effect of transportation 
credits on producers:  
 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
As with the first equation, the 𝐶𝐶 in this equation indexes the twelve months in each year 
for 2007 to 2015 and is the time series unit. Within the second model the cross-sectional 
units are: TC is the amount of money that is paid out each month for transportation 
credits, and Class3, KYCorn, and Milk Sales are the same as with the first model.  
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4.2 Data 
 
The original intent was for the data set to range from years 2000 to 2015. However, due 
to proprietary reasons, the pounds of diverted milk could only be provided for years 2007 
to 2015. The data is monthly from January 2007 to December 2015 for a total of 108 
observations. All of the variables that are represented in the results have the natural log 
taken of them. 
    
 
Figure 16. Descriptive Statistics for Fixed Effects Models
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION UNIT  MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX OBS. SOURCE 
LNUNIF7 
The monthly blend price that is the 
lowest amount pooled producers 
can receive for milk per cwt. 
$/cwt 
overall 2.99 0.1796 2.523 3.327 N =     108 
UW (2016) between  0.0498 2.920 3.053 n =      12 
within  0.1731 2.545 3.350 T =       9 
LNC2DIV The pounds of milk diverted into Class II that are pooled on Order 7 lbs 
overall 16.58 0.6268 14.06 17.58 N =     108 
Mkt. Admin between  0.2962 16.08 17.03 n =      12 
within  0.5583 14.45 17.65 T =       9 
LNC3DIV 
The pounds of milk diverted into 
Class III that are pooled on Order 
7 
lbs 
overall 17.43 0.6042 16.20 18.73 N =     108 
Mkt. Admin between  0.2995 16.97 17.84 n =      12 
within  0.5311 16.28 18.61 T =       9 
LNC4DIV 
The pounds of milk diverted into 
Class IV that are pooled on Order 
7 
lbs 
overall 16.85 0.7031 14.66 17.96 N =     108 
Mkt. Admin between  0.5453 15.86 17.50 n =      12 
within  0.4683 15.60 18.14 T =       9 
LNC3 
The advanced price which is 
calculated using the USDA's 
Current Price Formulas 
$/cwt 
overall 2.81 0.2061 2.231 3.202 N =     108 
UW (2016) between  0.0480 2.746 2.877 n =      12 
within  0.2008 2.282 3.234 T =       9 
LNKY The amount per bushel received for corn in the state of Kentucky $/bu 
overall 1.56 0.2469 1.137 1.986 N =     108 
UW (2016) between  0.0524 1.477 1.631 n =      12 
within  0.2417 1.176 2.016 T =       9 
LNSALES The estimated U.S. sales of fluid milk per month 
Mil 
$/Cw
t 
overall 8.39 0.0620 8.190 8.497 N =     108 
USDA-ERS between  0.0446 8.312 8.455 n =      12 
within  0.0446 8.259 8.459 T =       9 
LNTCDO~S 
The amount of dollars paid to 
processors/handlers each month 
that qualified for transportation 
credits 
$$ 
overall 14.17 0.3492 13.55 15.01 N =      74 
Mkt. Admin between 
 0.2909 13.86 14.79 n =       9 
within  0.2041 13.50 14.62 T = 8.22 
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The objective of the two models is to determine the effect of diverted pounds and 
transportation credits on the uniform price, therefore within this analysis, the dependent 
variable for both models is the uniform price for Order 7. The uniform price, which can 
also be referenced as the blend price, is the minimum price that producers can receive for 
their milk if they pool their milk on Order 7. It is the weighted average of the skim milk 
and butterfat pounds for each of the four classes. The mailbox price was another potential 
option to be the dependent variable. However, the mailbox price is determined by region 
rather than milk marketing order, and there are other factors within the mailbox price that 
would have been difficult to separate for this research.  
 
Milk is a heavily regulated commodity, and because of this, there is a significant amount 
of publically available data via USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS). Websites 
such as the University of Wisconsin’s Understanding Dairy Markets allow a plethora of 
milk-related data to be located in one area, which allowed for easy gathering data. As 
mentioned earlier, the only difficult data to gather was the order specific data that needed 
to be specially requested from the Order 7 market administrator.  
 
For the first model, the independent variables are: Class II, III, and IV diverted pounds of 
milk, Class III price, the price received for Kentucky corn, and the estimated U.S. sales of 
fluid milk. Milk that is diverted can be diverted into any class out of the four. Since Order 
7 has a high Class I utilization rate then milk that is diverted to Class I is unlikely to 
cause a decrease in the uniform price or a change in Class I utilization. However, milk 
that is diverted into Class II, III, or IV can decrease the uniform price. This is why the 
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number of pounds of milk diverted into these classes other than Class I are used in the 
first model. Additionally, a certain class could have more milk diverted into it on a 
regular basis. For this reason, each class was included to gauge its potential impact on the 
uniform price. The pounds of diverted milk were requested, and received, directly from 
the market administrator as they were not publically available via the Order 7 website.  
 
The Class III price has a strong correlation with the U.S. milk price and fluid milk price 
(Bolotova  & Novakovic, 2014; Bozic & Fortenberry, 2010). While the fluid milk price 
specifically refers to Class I milk, Order 7 has a high Class I utilization and because Class 
III price is correlated with the fluid milk price the advanced Class III milk price was 
included. Additionally, the advanced Class III skim milk price is directly calculated into 
the Class I price in months when it exceeds the advanced Class IV price. As mentioned 
earlier, the Understanding Dairy Markets website has a large collection of data located in 
one place, and the advanced Class III price was gathered from this site.  
 
The Kentucky feed price was included in this analysis as a control for feed prices. Feed 
prices can have an impact on milk prices through milk production. As corn price rises, 
producers are forced to consider alternative feedstuffs, which in turn influences milk 
production. Chavas, Kraus, and Jesse (1990) showed that feed prices could affect 
different regions differently. Their 1990 study found that the ‘East South Central’ region 
– Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi – experienced higher milk production 
during high feed costs (Chavas, Kraus, Jesse, 1990).  The variable was taken from the 
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Understanding Milk Markets website as well who pulled it from USDA’s National 
Agricultural Statistics Service Agricultural Prices.  
 
The estimated U.S. sales of fluid milk were derived from the Understanding Milk 
Markets website. The Understanding Milk Markets website pulled the sales information 
from the Estimated Fluid Milk Products Sales Report that is published by USDA-AMS. It 
has been mentioned many times that Order 7 has a high Class I utilization, but sales of 
fluid milk have been decreasing since around 2010. The decreasing sales of fluid milk 
can be hypothesized to have an effect on Class I utilization and therefore could have an 
effect on Order 7’s uniform price. For this reason and because this variable can be 
thought of like a milk supply measure, the estimated U.S. sales of fluid milk were 
included in this model.  
 
The second model contains several of the same explanatory variables, but there are four 
total independent variables: the amount of transportation credits paid (the number of 
dollars that went out to handlers/processors), the Class III price, the price received for 
Kentucky corn, and the estimated amount of fluid milk sales. The only new variable 
within the second model is the transportation credits information. A processor/handler 
has to apply for and claim transportation credits, and then based on the qualifications of 
the milk the processor/handler is claiming, the processor/handler is paid accordingly. The 
amount that is paid to processor/handlers for transportation credits is the explanatory 
variable in the second model. This data was gathered from the Order 7’s website. Within 
each annual statistical report, there is information related to how many dollars were 
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claimed for transportation credits and how many dollars were paid for transportation 
credits.  
 
4.3 Results 
 
The first fixed effects model quantifies the effect of Class II, III, and IV diversions on 
Order 7’s uniform price. The Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test was the first test 
run on the first model. This test failed to reject the null hypothesis, therefore, concluding 
that there were no significant differences between the months and that random effects are 
not an appropriate method for this model. The Hausman test showed that fixed effects 
were the appropriate method since the null hypothesis (random effects model is 
preferred) was rejected. To decrease the potential for heteroscedasticity since the 
variables used varied in units – the pounds of milk are in millions and prices of milk are 
dollars per hundredweight – the natural log of each variable was taken. However, there 
were still traces of heteroscedasticity in the model, so the “robust” option was used to 
control for heteroscedasticity by obtaining robust standard errors. From Table 5 below it 
can be seen that there were two significant variables out of a total of six explanatory 
variables. Both the Class II diversions and the Class III price are significant at the 1% 
level (p<.01).  
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R2   Obs. 108 
within 0.9133  Groups 12 
between 0.7457     
overall 0.9006     
      
corr(u_i, xb) -0.0590   f(6,11) 407.39 
    prob > f 0.0000 
variables coefficient robust st. error p>|t|  
 
Intercept 4.3233** 1.750 0.031   
Class II div -0.0236*** 0.007 0.009   
Class III div -0.0007 0.016 0.966   
Class IV div -0.0130 0.016 0.426   
Class III .7759*** 0.035 0.000   
KY corn .0123 0.025 0.636   
Fluid milk sales -.3470 0.231 0.161   
Sigma_u 0.0257     
Sigma_e 0.0556     
Rho 0.1766     
***  0.01% significance, ** 0 .05% significance, * 0.10% significance 
Table 5. Diversions Fixed Effects Model Results 
 
Out of the three classes of diversions, only Class II diversions had a statistical 
significance on Order 7’s uniform price. This finding of diversions having a negative 
impact on uniform price was expected. The model shows that ceteris paribus, a 1% 
increase in Class II diversions will have a .0236% decrease on Order 7’s uniform price. 
This effect is small and could amount to pennies on the uniform price. However, it is 
significant which is important to consider. If Class II diversions were to increase 1%, 
holding everything else constant – and the uniform price was set at $16.00 – the price 
would decrease by $0.0038. A 1% change in diversions wouldn’t be expected to garner a 
large amount of change. However, if Class II diversions were to increase by 5% then the 
uniform price – once again, set at $16.00 – would decrease by $0.018. The uniform price 
would then be $15.98 per hundredweight. Another example is if Class II diversions were 
to increase by 10% then, ceteris paribus, the uniform price – set at $16.00 – would 
 57   
 
decrease by $0.038. As can be seen in Tables 6 and 7, the effect of increasing Class II 
diversions on a dairy farm are relatively small.  
  
  Uniform Price - $16.00 
Po
un
ds
 o
f M
ilk
 P
ro
du
ce
d 5% Per cow 60 Cow Farm 
17,000 $0.31 $18.6 
20,000 $0.36 $21.6 
25,000 $0.45 $27.0 
30,000 $0.54 $32.4 
Table 6. 5% Increase in Class II Diversions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. 10% Increase in Class II Diversions 
 
This finding supports the hypothesis that diversions have a negative effect on the uniform 
price. The statistical significance of Class II on the uniform price could be because as 
Class IV products consumption remains relatively stable and Class III steadily climbs 
higher Class II milk is where the excess milk goes making a more significant determinant 
of Class I price. The figure below (Figure 17) shows the rise in Class III consumption 
 
Uniform Price - $16.00 
Po
un
ds
 o
f M
ilk
 P
ro
du
ce
d 10% Per cow 60 Cow Farm 
17,000 $0.65 $39.0 
20,000 $0.76 $45.6 
25,000 $0.95 $57.0 
30,000 $1.14 $68.4 
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(American and Other cheese as listed in ERS) and the constant usage of Class IV (Butter, 
dry whole milk, nonfat dry milk, and dry buttermilk as listed in ERS). 
 
 
  Figure 17. Class III and IV Consumption (USDA-ERS, Dairy Data 2016) 
 
The Class III and IV diversions also show a negative impact on the uniform price. 
However, their impact is not statistically significant. This is not the result that was 
expected. Class III, out of the nine years of data, had the most pounds of milk diverted at 
over 4,798 million pounds, and Class IV had the second most pounds at over 2,792 
million pounds. Since Class III and Class IV had more diverted pounds than Class II, 
over 1,979 million pounds, their significance was expected to be more statistically 
significant than Class II. Since this was not the case, it could be assumed that while Class 
III and IV have large quantities diverted, the amount is more consistent than Class II and 
has been for the nine years of data analyzed within this study.  
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The variable Class III had a positive impact on Order 7’s uniform price, and this is a 
result that would be expected. The model shows that a 1% increase in the advanced Class 
III price, ceteris paribus, leads to a .7759% increase in Order 7’s uniform price. For 
example, if the advanced Class III price increases by 1% then the uniform price – if set at 
$16.00 – would increase by $0.12. The advanced Class III price is a driver of the uniform 
price calculation, therefore, the higher the Class III price is then, theoretically, the higher 
the uniform price. The advanced Class III price also has a significant impact on Order 7’s 
uniform price. This is a result we would expect because Class III is a driver of uniform 
price.  
 
Though Kentucky corn shows a positive sign for Order 7’s uniform price the variable is 
not statistically significant. The result of not being significant is not what we would 
expect, though the positive sign is. The expectation of a positive impact of Kentucky corn 
on uniform price is because of the rationale that an increase in feed costs would decrease 
milk supply due to farmers changing their feed rations and substituting corn for a 
component that is not as nutritional. However, as Wolf (2010) points out “milk supply 
does not adjust immediately to changes in feed costs.” The Kentucky corn price and 
Order 7’s uniform price do not move consistently, as can be seen in Figure 18, and the 
uniform price experienced greater volatility than Kentucky corn. 
 60   
 
 
Figure 18. Uniform and KY Corn Price (University of Wisconsin Dairy Marketing 
and Risk Management Program, Understanding Milk Markets) 
 
The last variable within the first model is the estimated U.S. fluid milk sales. The model 
shows that there is a negative effect of estimated U.S. fluid milk sales on the uniform 
price. This result is to be expected as well. While not a significant variable, the milk sales 
help to represent demand. As demand for fluid milk decreases and milk 
supply/production stays constant, the uniform price should fall. The rationale for the 
estimated U.S. fluid milk sales having a negative effect on Order 7’s uniform price is 
because Order 7 primarily processes fluid milk. The decline of fluid milk sales could 
decrease Class I utilization and then have a negative effect on the uniform price.   
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R2   Obs. 74 
within 0.9064  Groups 9 
between 0.5771     
overall 0.8792     
      
corr(u_i, xb) -0.0957        f(4,8) 383.68 
    prob > f 0.0000 
variables coefficient robust st. error p>|t|  
 
Intercept 3.7533 2.074 0.108   
TC 0.0333 0.022 0.166   
Class III 0.7766*** 0.055 0.000   
KY corn -0.0210 0.019 0.307   
Fluid milk sales -0.4020 0.0231 0.120   
Sigma_u 0.0351     
Sigma_e 0.0557     
Rho 0.2845     
***0.01% significance, ** 0.05% significance, * 0.10% significance 
Table 8. Transportation Credits Fixed Effects Model Results (w/sales) 
 
The second fixed effects model analyzes the effect of money paid towards transportation 
credits on the uniform price for Order 7. The second model went through the same tests 
as the first model as well as the natural log being taken for each variable within the 
model. While the second model did not have an issue with heteroscedasticity, the 
“robust” option was still used.  This second model, which can be viewed above in Table 
8, showed that only one variable, the advanced Class III price, has a statistically 
significant impact on Order 7’s uniform price. This significant variable is consistent with 
the first model. The results of this model, though, could be skewed by a smaller set of 
observations. Transportation credits are only paid out during certain months of the year, 
meaning that during certain months $0 were requested and paid. Because of this, the 
number of observations went from 108 (the number of observations in the first model) to 
74.  
 
 62   
 
The first variable, the money paid for transportation credits, is shown to have a positive 
impact on uniform price. However, the transportation credits do not have a statistically 
significant impact on Order 7’s uniform price. The expectation was for transportation 
credits to have a negative effect on Order 7’s uniform price. However, as mentioned 
earlier, a small number of observations could have a biased effect on the model.  
 
The Class III variable is consistent with the first model. The advanced Class III price has 
a positive effect on Order 7’s uniform price and is statistically significant. Additionally, 
the Class III price impact in the second model (0.7766) is almost the same as the first 
model (0.7759). The advanced Class III price shows that a 1% increase in the Class III 
price will, ceteris paribus, have a 0.7766% increase in Order 7’s uniform price. 
 
The Kentucky corn price within this second model shows a negative effect on Order 7’s 
uniform price and is not statistically significant. While the Kentucky corn price was not 
significant in the first model, it had a positive impact on the uniform price. This could be 
due to the decrease in some observations because of the months that transportation credits 
can be requested. The months that the transportation credits were paid out for Order 7 
could coincide with certain months (seasons) that the Kentucky corn price increases 
while the uniform price decreases or, where the corn price decreases while the uniform 
price increases. The transportation credits are available during months that local supply is 
determined not to be able to meet demand. However, as can be seen below in Figure 19, 
the uniform price for Order 7 has been volatile and unpredictable seasonally.  In 2012, 
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the uniform price steadily rose from June to November, but in 2011 the price dropped 
from August to December.  
 
 
Figure 19. Yearly Prices By Month for Order 7 Uniform Price (USDA-AMS, Florida and 
Southeast Marketing Areas) 
 
Within this second model, fluid milk sales are consistent with the first model. Both 
results are shown to have a negative effect on uniform price but are not statistically 
significant. This impact is what would be expected, though, because of high the Class I 
utilization is within Order 7 it would also be expected to be statistically significant. 
Interestingly, when estimated U.S. fluid milk sales are dropped from the transportation 
credits model (as can be seen in Table 7), the R2 for between group rises from 0.5771 or 
almost 58% of the model explained to 0.8660, or almost 87%, of the model, explained 
between groups. Additionally, the overall R2 rises from .8792, almost 88%, to .8941, 
roughly 89% of the overall model is explained.  
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R2   Obs. 74 
within 0.8975  Groups 9 
between 0.8660     
overall 0.8941     
      
corr(u_i, xb) -0.0669        f(3,8) 228.03 
    prob > f 0.0000 
variables coefficient Robust st. error p>|t|   
Intercept 0.5066 0.349 0.186   
TC 0.0187 0.034 0.585   
Class III 0.8010*** 0.037 0.000   
KY corn -0.0291 0.030 0.341   
***0.01% significance, **0.05% significance, *0.10% significance 
Table 9. Transportation Credits Fixed Effects Model Results (w/o sales) 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This study addressed the effect of lower class diversions and transportation credits on the 
Southeast Order’s uniform price. Two fixed effects models were estimated to quantify the 
effects of diversions and transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price. The first 
model’s analysis showed that out of the three lower class diversions only Class II had a 
statistically significant impact. The second model that quantified transportation credits 
impact on uniform price showed there was no statistically significant impact of the 
money paid out for transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price.  
 
The policy implications of this study are that diversions could be further looked into to 
ensure that both producers and processors/handlers are being fairly treated with the 
Southeast milk marketing order. This study showed the Class II diversions have a 
significant impact on Order 7’s uniform price, and while that impact is small, it is still 
important to consider. However, the impact of transportation credits on the uniform price 
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is statistically nonexistent meaning that transportation credits are having the intended 
effect of moving milk from low utilization areas to high utilization and are not having a 
negative impact on producers within the Southeast Order.  
 
There were some limitations with this study. The main limitation was the lack of research 
investigating the effects of diversions and transportation credits on the federal milk 
marketing orders. The topic has come up within orders before such as requests to lower 
the diversion limit, but depending on the milk production level of pooled producers the 
responses have varied. Due to this limitation of limited research, the ability to draw from 
previous studies and build upon this area was not possible. However, this limitation did 
open up the door for this area to begin being looked at more in-depth. 
 
With the lack of research, a second limitation is the lack of publicly available data. The 
market administrators for both Order 5 and Order 7 were very helpful at putting together 
each data requests that was submitted. Unfortunately, due to concerns about releasing 
proprietary information, regarding diverted pounds of milk, the data set was limited to the 
years 2007 to 2015 instead of the desired 2000 to 2015. In the future, hopefully, milk 
marketing order data will be more easily accessible online or through a different 
database. 
 
This research helps lay the groundwork for more research into the effect of diversions on 
milk marketing orders. The effect of diversions could vary by milk marketing order 
depending on the milk supply within the order’s boundaries. Since the Appalachian and 
Southeast Orders are the only two orders with a transportation credit balancing fund more 
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research to compare the effects of transportation credits on each order could be done to 
fully understand the effects of the credits on producers. While this study showed there 
was no effect on Southeast producers, there could potentially be an effect on Appalachian 
producers, since there is a difference in assessment rates between the two orders.  
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Chapter 5: Summary 
 
Within this study, a history of the federal milk marketing orders has been presented, a 
case study of the southern milk marketing orders, and an analytical look at the effects of 
lower class diversions and transportation credits on the Southeast Order’s uniform price. 
The federal milk marketing orders have evolved extensively since their implementation 
in 1937 under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement. Since that time the regional 
boundaries of the marketing orders have grown to the current 10 milk marketing orders 
we have.  
 
Three out of the ten orders, the Southern orders, have unique qualities that make them 
stand out compared to the other orders. In particular, the Southern orders have low 
diversion limits relative to the seven other orders. These diversion limits have been set to 
curb the “milk deficit” status that currently describes these orders. Farmers within the 
Appalachian and Southeast Orders have been concerned that the diversion limits are set 
too high and are negatively affecting their uniform price. A 2014 request to lower 
diversion limits to 0% opened the order to comments from both producers and 
processors. While a majority of processors were not open to the request of lowering the 
(USDA-AMS, Florida and Southeast Marketing Areas, Combined Comments, 2014).  
There has also been anecdotal evidence that farmers have been feeling contention 
towards transportation credits as well.  
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Part of this study addressed farmer concerns by using panel data to analyze the effects of 
lower class diversions and transportation credits on Order 7’s uniform price. While the 
transportation credits were found to have no effect on the uniform price, Class II 
diversions were found to have a negative and statistically significant impact. This finding 
suggests that more research should happen to ensure that both producers and processors 
are being treated equally within the federal milk marketing system.  
 
The research within this study sets up a foundation for future research on diversions and 
transportation credits and discusses results that could have policy implications. Overall, 
this study presented an inclusive view of the federal milk marketing system with a special 
focus on the southern orders.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  
Glossary 
 
Class I Differentials: A differential that is added to the Class I Skim Milk Price. The 
differential is based on location and can range from $0.00 to $4.50.  
 
Class Utilization: The percentage of pooled milk that is processed per class within a 
federal milk marketing order 
 
Component Prices: The price of butterfat, protein, nonfat milk solids, and other milk 
solids using the product price, make allowance, and yield.  
 
Make Allowance: The estimated manufacturing cost of a component per pound produced.  
 
Mailbox Price: The net price received by dairy farmers at their farm gates. This includes 
all payments received for milk sold less the cost associated with marketing the milk 
(ERS, 2016). 
 
Diversion Limits: The maximum percentage of pooled milk within a federal milk 
marketing order that a pool plant may divert to a non-pool plant.  
 
Uniform (Blend) Price: The minimum price in a federal milk marketing order that a milk 
producer can receive if they pool their milk in that order. 
 
Yield Factor: How much one pound of a milk component can produce a certain product. 
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Appendix 2 
Glossary 
 
Class I Differentials: A differential that is added to the Class I Skim Milk Price. The 
differential is based on location and can range from $0.00 to $4.50.  
 
Diversion Limits: The maximum percentage of pooled milk within a federal milk 
marketing order that a pool plant may divert to a non-pool plant.  
 
Mailbox Price: The net price received by dairy farmers at their farm gates. This includes 
all payments received for milk sold less the cost associated with marketing the milk 
(Mark, et al., 2016). 
 
Non-pool Plant: A plant that is fully regulated by another federal order, a producer-
handler plant, a partially regulated distributing plant, an unregulated supply plant, or an 
exempt plant (USDA-AMS, Order Regulating the handling of Milk in the Southeast 
Marketing Area, 2014). 
 
Pool Plant: A fully regulated plant that is either a distributing plant, a supply plant, a 
plant within the marketing area operated by a coop, or two or more plants operated by the 
same handler and within the same marketing area (USDA-AMS, Order Regulating the 
handling of Milk in the Southeast Marketing Area, 2014). 
 
Uniform (Blend) Price: The minimum price in a federal milk marketing order that a milk 
producer can receive if they pool their milk on that order. 
 
Transportation Credits: Funds that are gathered into a Transportation Credit Balancing 
Fund and can be used to aid plants in bring in milk from out of the order 
 
Delivery Day Requirements: The amount of days a producer or cooperative is required to 
deliver milk to a pool plant in order for their milk to be pooled on an order.
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Appendix 3 
 
Current Milk Pricing Formulas 
 
USDA-AMS, Current Price Formulas
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.965)  + (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 
=  𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 
+  𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙. 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 
=  𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝
+  (𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 100). 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.965) +  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 +  $0.70. 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 +  $0.007. 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶
9 . 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.965)  +  (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.1)  +  (𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 5.9). 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  ((𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.2003) 𝑥𝑥 1.383)  
+  ((((𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.2003) 𝑥𝑥 1.572) –  𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.9) 𝑥𝑥 1.17). 
𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 𝑎𝑎ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.1991) 𝑥𝑥 1.03. 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 –  0.1715) 𝑥𝑥 1.211. 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 0.965) +  (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 3.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑥𝑥 9. 
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  (𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 −  0.1678) 𝑥𝑥 0.99. 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 =  𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. 
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